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Abstract: 
The starting point of this paper is a climate coalition which seeks to reduce global emissions. It is well 
known from the literature on (spatial) carbon leakage that the climate effect of unilateral measures 
may be partly offset by the actions of the free-riders. Furthermore, from the literature on the green 
paradox, we know that stringent demand-side policies in the future may increase present emissions. 
The novelty of this paper is that we also explore how the coalition’s future policies regarding own 
fossil fuel production (supply-side policies) affect the present emissions from the free-riders. In 
particular, we find that a credible announcement of future unilateral supply-side policies reduces 
early foreign emissions. We derive the optimal combination of consumer taxes and producer taxes 
when both spatial and intertemporal leakages from the free-riders are taken into account. We show 
that the tax shares generally differ over time, and that a declining present value of the social cost of 
carbon over time supports a time path where the consumer tax’s share of the total carbon tax also 
declines over time. We illustrate our findings with a numerical model for the global fossil fuel markets, 
considering European unilateral carbon policies. 
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Sammendrag 
Utgangspunktet for denne studien er en klimakoalisjon som samarbeider om å redusere de globale 
utslippene. Det er vel kjent fra litteraturen om (geografisk) karbonlekkasje at klimaeffekten av 
ensidige tiltak kan bli delvis motvirket av responsen fra land som står utenfor koalisjonen 
(«gratispassasjerene»). Vi vet også fra litteraturen om «det grønne paradokset» at stigende 
karbonavgifter over tid kan øke dagens produksjon av fossil energi, og derigjennom utslipp. Vårt 
bidrag til litteraturen er at vi undersøker hvordan koalisjonens fremtidige klimapolitikk rettet mot 
deres egen produksjon av fossil energi påvirker dagens utslipp fra gratispassasjerene. Spesielt finner vi 
at en troverdig plan for framtidig tilbudssidepolitikk reduserer dagens utslipp fra gratispassasjerene. Vi 
finner den optimale kombinasjonen av avgifter på konsum og produksjon når det tas hensyn til både 
geografisk og intertemporal lekkasje fra gratispassasjerene. Vi viser at, på ethvert tidspunkt, skal 
summen av konsumentavgift og produsentavgift være lik den marginale skaden av utslipp. Andelen 
konsumentavgift/produsentavgift av den totale avgiften vil imidlertid variere over tid. Den vil avhenge 
av miljøskaden, geografisk lekkasje, intertemporal lekkasje, og netto importkostander fra fossil energi. 
For eksempel vil en nedgang i nåverdien av den marginale miljøskaden over tid støtte en avgiftsbane 
der også konsumentavgiftens andel av den totale avgiften faller over tid.  Vi illustrerer våre analytiske 
resultater med en numerisk modell av de globale fossile energimarkedene, der vi vurderer virkningene 
av en ensidig europeisk klimapolitikk. 
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1 Introduction 
The Paris climate conference (COP21) in December 2015 led to an ambitious global agreement on the 
goal for global warming; it should stay well below 2°C. However, the emission pledges made by the 
signatories are far from sufficient to reach the 2 degree target. Furthermore, the commitments are not 
legally binding.1 It is therefore reasonable to suspect that the nonbinding promises for emission 
reductions will not be implemented by all countries. 
Hence, there is a need for knowledge about how to construct more ambitious agreements in a world 
where the willingness to contribute is very unevenly distributed across countries. The starting point of 
this paper is that a group of countries establish a climate coalition which seeks to reduce global 
emissions, whereas the rest of the world pursues their self-interest.  
Both reduced consumption of fossil fuels (demand-side policies) and reduced supply of fossil fuels 
(supply-side polices) within the climate coalition affect the world market prices, and thereby emissions 
from the free-riders. Therefore, in order to design efficient climate policies, the climate coalition must 
take into account the responses from the free-riders. 
As fossil fuels are non-renewable resources, a climate coalition’s (credible) commitment to future 
climate policies will typically change the free-riders optimal extraction path for their non-renewable 
resources. This again will influence fossil fuel prices and the free-riders’ emissions from consumption 
of fossil fuels, both in the present and in the future.  
Thus, the coalition’s climate policy measures in one period affect the emissions from the free-riders 
both in the same period (spatial leakage) and in the other periods (intertemporal leakage). In the next 
section we provide a literature overview of supply versus demand-side policies, and spatial and 
intertemporal leakage.  Our theoretical contribution to the literature is that we investigate how supply-
side measures, i.e., policies that reduce domestic fossil fuel extraction, affect intertemporal leakage 
from the free-riders. Furthermore, we derive the climate coalition’s optimal combination of demand-
side and supply-side policies when both spatial and intertemporal leakages from the free-riders are 
taken into account. The present paper is, to the authors’ best knowledge, the first paper to address 
supply versus demand-side policies in a dynamic model with free riders.  
                                                     
1 The agreement refers to the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) submitted by the parties before the 
meeting. However, the targets specified in the INDCs are not legally binding, and there is no enforcement mechanism to 
ensure that the pledges are met. Moreover, it is not clear to what extent the targets specified in the INDCs always represent 
emission reductions comparted to a BAU scenario. 
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1.1 Review of the literature 
In the review of relevant literature we distinguish between two dimensions of emission leakage: spatial 
and intertemporal, and between two sources for the leakage: demand-side policy and supply-side 
policy in the regulating country.   
Most studies of spatial carbon leakages have so far been done in a static framework, in which there is 
obviously no intertemporal leakage. Furthermore, the studies typically target consumption of fossil 
fuels, i.e., demand-side policies. Policy measures that reduce fossil fuel demand lead to lower 
international energy prices, and may also reduce the competitiveness of domestic firms in the world 
markets for energy-intensive goods. Both effects cause increased consumption of and emissions from 
fossil fuels among free-riders (positive spatial leakage). In the literature, this is commonly referred to 
as “carbon leakage”, and often measured in percentages of the domestic emission reduction in the 
regulating country (leakage rate). There is a vast literature on spatial carbon leakage (see, e.g., 
Rauscher, 1997 and Böhringer et al., 2010). Most studies suggest a leakage rate in the range of 5-30 
percent. That is, a reduction of 100 units of CO2 in the regulating country leads to an increase of 5-30 
units of CO2 in non-regulating countries (see, e.g., Zhang, 2012; Böhringer et al., 2012). There are, 
however, a few studies with negative leakage (Elliott and Fullerton, 2014) or leakage rates above 100 
percent (Babiker, 2005).  
To counteract the carbon leakage following from demand-side measures, supply-side policies have 
been suggested (see, e.g., Bohm 1993). Lower supply of fossil fuels cause the prices to rise and leads 
to lower consumption among the free-riders (negative spatial leakage).2 In a static model, Hoel (1994) 
derived theoretically the (second-best) optimal combination of producer and consumer taxes in a 
climate coalition, given a target for global emission reductions. Golombek et al. (1995) and Fæhn et al. 
(2016) provide numerical illustrations of the optimal combination of demand-side versus supply-side 
policies in a static setting. Harstad (2012) shows that leakage can be completely avoided by buying 
marginal foreign fuel deposits for conservation. Although this is a promising result, buying foreign 
deposits for internal conservation may face several practical and political problems. Furthermore, 
neither of the above papers on supply-side policies explicitly addresses the problem of intertemporal 
leakage. 
Intertemporal emission leakage follows from the fact that fossil fuels are non-renewable resources. 
This was early recognized by Sinclair (1992), who pointed out that attempts to curb fossil fuel usage 
                                                     
2 Asheim (2013) gives a distributional argument for supply-side policies. 
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trigger a response from the fossil fuel producers. In particular, present value carbon taxes should 
decline over time as increasing carbon taxes accelerates emissions. The reason is that the future value 
of the fossil fuel resource is deteriorated by increasing taxes, making it profitable to move extraction 
forward in time. By similar reasoning, Sinn (2008) argues that climate policies might actually increase 
emissions, at least in the short run, and termed this effect the “green paradox”.  There is a large 
literature following up on this phenomenon (see, e.g., Gerlagh, 2010; Hoel 2010, 2011; van der Ploeg 
and Withagen, 2012a, 2012b; Eichner and Pethig, 2015; Ritter and Schopf, 2014; Jensen et al., 2015).  
None of the above mentioned studies on intertemporal leakage examines supply-side policies. Hoel 
(2013) investigates whether there also might be some kind of green paradox related to supply-side 
policies. However, he considers a single region and thereby ignores spatial and intertemporal leakage 
caused by the free-riders’ response to supply-side policies within a coalition.  
The novelty of this paper is that we address both dimensions of emission leakage (spatial and 
intertemporal) and considers both sources for the leakage (demand-side policy and supply side policy). 
This enables us to find the optimal combination of demand-side policy and supply-side policy over 
time.  
1.2 Main results 
In the present paper, we use a two-period, two-region analytical model to analyse the welfare impacts 
of domestic climate policy measures in a climate coalition. Emissions arise from consumption of a 
carbon intensive good controlled by resource owners who choose the extraction profile that maximizes 
the present value of their reserves. Extraction costs are increasing in cumulative extraction, leading to 
less than full extraction of known carbon reserves. The climate coalition takes account of both spatial 
and intertemporal leakages when designing the optimal combination of domestic demand and supply-
side measures.  
We find that demand-side policies lead to positive intertemporal and spatial leakages, whereas supply-
side policies lead to leakages of the same magnitudes, but with negative signs. For example, if the 
coalition decides today to reduce future domestic demand for fossil fuels and this is announced and 
considered credible, foreign consumption of fossils fuels increases both today and in the future. 
However, if the coalition instead credibly announces reductions in future domestic supply of fossil 
fuels, foreign consumption decreases both today and in the future. Note that the latter case is the 
opposite of the green paradox: credible commitment to stringent future carbon mitigation measures 
reduces current fossil fuel consumption. Further, optimal climate policy implies a combination of 
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demand and supply-side policies such that the total carbon tax equals the marginal environmental 
damage caused by current period emissions. Thus, we show that an important result from the static 
model in Hoel (1994) also holds in an intertemporal setting. We also derive results about the 
development of the optimal demand and supply-side tax trajectories. In particular, we investigate how 
the development of the social cost of carbon over time affects the distribution of the carbon tax across 
consumers and producers.  We find that a declining social cost of carbon over time typically supports a 
decline in the consumer tax’s share of the total carbon tax over time. 
We illustrate our results with a numerical model for the global fossil fuels markets, assuming that the 
coalition is the European Economic Area (EEA).3 We find the optimal combination of consumer taxes 
and producer taxes over time, and show that it is optimal to let the consumers carry the largest tax 
burden. Furthermore, we illustrate how a declining present value of the social cost of carbon over time 
supports a time path where the consumers’ tax share of the total carbon tax also declines over time.  
2 Theoretical analysis  
In section 2.1, we present the model and derive how the climate coalition’s demand-side and supply-
side policies affect emissions from free riders (spatial and intertemporal leakages), as well as global 
emissions. In section 2.2, we find the optimal levels of the climate coalition’s consumption and 
production of fossil fuels over time, and characterize the consumer and producer taxes which induce 
this outcome.  
2.1 An intertemporal model for unilateral climate policy 
We consider a climate coalition (”home country”) that aims to reduce damages from global emissions 
of greenhouse gases through a combination of domestic demand and supply-side policies. In this 
section, we simplify by considering two periods and one aggregate fossil fuel. Capital letters are 
assigned to the free-riders’ (foreign’s) variables and small letters are assigned to domestic variables.  
Let xt and yt (Xt and Yt) denote production and consumption in period t, respectively. Furthermore, let 
( )t tc a  and ( )t tC A  be convex and increasing functions that denote the coalition’s and foreign’s cost of 
producing fossil fuel as a function of aggregated production at time t ( ta  and tA ). Fossil fuel is traded 
in the international market at price pt. We normalize units such that consuming one unit of fossil fuel 
                                                     
3 The EEA brings together the EU Member States and the three EFTA States Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway in a single 
market. 
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causes one unit of emissions. Market equilibrium requires global production to equal global 
consumption in each period. Market equilibrium and the above normalization w.r.t. emissions imply: 
 t t t t tx X E y Y ,     (1) 
where Et is global emissions. There is damage caused by the stock of carbon in the atmosphere (St) in 
each period ( ( )t tZ S ). We simplify by assuming that a share given by  0,1   of the emissions in 
period 1 remains in the atmosphere from one period to the next. In a two period model with 
 1,2t T   we have: 
  
1 0 1 0 1 1
2 1 2 0 1 1 2 2
S x X ,
S S x X x X ,
S E S
E S
    
          (2) 
where S0 is the initial stock of carbon in the atmosphere. The social cost of carbon at time t (vt) is the 
marginal damage of one additional unit of emissions: 
 1 2
2
1 1 2
2 2
(S ) (S ),
(S ),
S S
S
v Z Z
v Z
  
  (3) 
where  0,1   is the discount factor.  
We assume that the coalition can control domestic production and consumption of fossil fuels using 
taxes or other regulatory measures. Hence, we treat domestic production and consumption as 
exogenous. In the next section we will model taxes explicitly. In the following, we refer to reduced 
consumption (yt) in the home country as demand-side policies, whereas reduced production (xt) in the 
home country is coined supply-side policies. 
Foreign consumption of fossil fuels in period t is a decreasing function of the price in that period 
t t tY D (p )  (with   0t t t tD p / p D    ). We assume that foreign producers are competitive and 
maximize the present value of their income from fossil fuel production over both periods. In 
particular, this implies that the marginal discounted profits from the resource are equalized across 
time. Otherwise, the resource owners could increase the value of the resource by moving production 
from one period to the other. The foreign producer’s extraction profile solves: 
  
1 2
1Max t t t t t
X ,X t T
p X C A ,

        (4) 
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subject to the state variable equations A1=X1 and A2=X1+X2. The first order conditions are given by: 
 1 1 2
2 2
0
0
p C C ,
p C .
   
    (5) 
Note that the term 2C  is the scarcity value (or shadow price) of the resource. It is negative because 
increased production in period 1 implies higher production cost and hence lower profit in period 2. 
The first order conditions in (5) and the state variable equations implicitly define the foreign supply 
functions for fossil fuels, 1 1 2( , )X p p  and 2 1 2( , )X p p , where (see Appendix A for calculations): 
 
1 1
1 1 2 1
2 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 2
1 0 0
1 0 0
X X, ,
p C p C
X X C C, .
p C p C C
       
            
  (6) 
Inserting the functions for foreign demand and supply into the market equilibrium conditions (1) 
yields: 
 1 2 1 2t t t t t tx X ( p , p ) y D ( p ) E , t , .       (7) 
We consider an equilibrium with strictly positive foreign production in both periods and unique 
market clearing prices such that (7) holds. These prices are functions of net demand from the home 
country in both periods:  
 1 1 2 2 1 2t tp p ( y x , y x ), t ,      (8) 
Increased net imports leads to higher international prices in both periods; i.e. we have: 
   0 1 2ts s
p , t ,s ,
y x
      (9) 
The exact expressions for  t s sp / y x    are given in Appendix A. The resource becomes scarcer if 
net domestic imports increases in at least one period. This increases the resource rent of foreign 
producers and, hence, the resource price is higher in both periods.  
As international fossil fuel prices are functions of net import from the home country, both supply-side   
and demand-side policies will affect emissions abroad (carbon leakage). We define carbon leakage 
following from demand-side policies, tsL , as the increase in emissions abroad at time t following from 
a unit reduction in domestic consumption at time s: 
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   1 2t tts ts s s
Y pL D , t ,s ,
y y x
         (10) 
Note that the production levels ( sx ) are kept constant in (10). By keeping the consumption levels ( sy ) 
constant, we find that the carbon leakages following from a unit reduction in domestic supply of fossil 
fuel are given by:  
   1 2t tt tss s s
Y pD L , t ,s ,
x y x
         (11) 
As the international fuel prices are functions of net domestic demand, the carbon leakage following 
from demand-side policies and supply-side policies will have identical magnitudes, but opposite signs.  
We will refer to ttL  ( ttL ) as spatial carbon leakage, that is, increased emissions abroad at time t 
following a unit reduction in domestic consumption (supply) at time t. Similarly, tsL  (- tsL  ), t s , is 
the intertemporal carbon leakage, that is, increased emissions abroad at time t following a unit 
reduction in domestic consumption (supply) at time s.  
Proposition 1. Consider a climate coalition that implements domestic measures to reduce global 
emissions. Then demand-side policies lead to positive intertemporal and spatial leakages, whereas 
supply-side policies lead to leakages of the same magnitudes, but with negative signs.  
Proof. See Appendix A for proof that 0tsL  and 0ttL  . 
Hence, if the coalition reduces future domestic demand for fossil fuels, foreign consumption of fossils 
fuels increases both now and in the future. On the other hand, if the coalition reduces future domestic 
supply of fossil fuels, foreign consumption decreases both today and in the future. 
A decrease in domestic consumption in period t reduces the price in that period, implying more foreign 
consumption and emissions in period t. A decrease in domestic consumption in period t also decreases 
the residual demand faced by foreign producers in that period. Therefore, foreign production decreases 
in period t, implying that more resource is available for production in the other period s.4 This 
                                                     
4 The shift in foreign production across periods can also be seen from equation (5): if domestic consumption in period 2 
decreases, the equilibrium price and foreign production in period 2 decreases, implying a lower absolute value resource 
rent 2C   (for any given 1X ) and, hence, more foreign production in period 1. Conversely, if domestic consumption in 
period 1 decreases, foreign firms will produce less in period 1. Thus, marginal production cost 2C  in period 2 decreases 
(for any given 2X ) , implying higher foreign production in period 2. The argument is similar for supply side policies. 
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decreases the world market price in period s; i.e. domestic demand-side measures in period t induce 
lower prices and higher foreign consumption and emissions in both periods (positive leakage).  
On the other hand, a decrease in domestic production in period t increases the price in that period, 
implying less foreign consumption and emissions in period t. A decrease in domestic production also 
increases the residual demand faced by foreign producers in that period. Therefore, foreign production 
increases in period t. Increased foreign production in period t implies that less resource is available for 
production in the other period s. This entails reduced foreign production and hence a higher world 
market resource price also in period s. The higher fuel prices reduce foreign emissions from 
consumption in both periods (negative leakage).  
Note that supply-side policies within the coalition do not reduce emissions from the coalition, but 
reduces global emissions through the responses from the free-riders. Demand-side polices reduce 
emissions from the coalition in the period the policy is undertaken, but the impact on global emissions 
is dampened by leakage from the free-riders.  
We have the following results regarding the global impact of unilateral policies:  
Proposition 2. Consider a climate coalition that implements domestic measures to reduce global 
emissions. Then we have the following: 
i. If both domestic consumption and production is reduced by one unit in period t, global 
emissions are reduced by one unit in that period, and are unaffected in the other period.  
ii. Both demand and supply-side policies in period t lead to lower global emissions in period 
t.  
iii. Demand-side policies in period t lead to higher global emissions in period s, whereas 
supply-side policies in period t lead to lower global emissions in period s ( t s ).  
iv. Both demand and supply-side policies in period t induce lower total accumulated 
emissions ( 1 2E E ) 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The first part of Proposition 1 holds because the world market price is unaffected if both domestic 
production and domestic consumption is reduced by the same amount in period t. Hence, there is no 
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leakage if domestic supply and consumption is reduced by the same amount.5 This result show that an 
important result from the static model in Bohm (1993) also holds in an intertemporal setting. 
Part ii reflects that the spatial leakage must be less than unity in the partial equilibrium framework 
employed in this paper.6 Reduced domestic consumption induces lower equilibrium prices and 
increased consumption abroad. However, the increase in foreign consumption must be less than the 
domestic reduction due to downward sloping demand functions.  
Part iii follows directly from the sign of the intertemporal leakages derived in Proposition 1. 
The last part iv holds because the sum of spatial and intertemporal leakages is less than unity; i.e., total 
emissions decline if the climate coalition implements supply or demand-side policies to reduce carbon 
emissions. Table 1 summarizes the results from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. 
 
 Demand-side policy period t Supply-side policy period t 
Change in foreign emissions in 
same period t 
Change in foreign emissions in 
other period s 
Change in world emissions in 
same period t 
0t tt
t
Y L
y
    
0s st
t
Y L
y
    
1 0t tt
t
E L
y
      
0t tt
t
Y L
x
     
0s st
t
Y L
x
     
0t tt
t
E L
x
     
Change in world emissions in 
other period s 
Change in world emissions 
over both periods 
0s st
t
E L
y
    
1 0t s tt st
t t
E E L L
y y
       
0s st
t
E L
x
     
0t s tt st
t t
E E L L
x x
        
Table 1. Changes in emissions following domestic supply and demand-side policies in period t (
1 2t ,s , , t s ). 
 
                                                     
5 Remember that domestic production and consumption are regulated in both time periods. 
6 See Karp (2010) for a discussion about carbon leakage using partial versus general equilibrium models. 
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Proposition 2 has some implications for welfare. Gerlagh (2010) distinguishes between a weak and a 
strong kind of green paradox. The weak green paradox arises when early emissions increase because 
fossil fuel owners anticipate bleaker future market conditions (e.g., because of lower fuel demand in 
the future) and therefore accelerates production. The strong green paradox arises when the 
intertemporal adjustment of the resource owners not only increases early emissions, but the present 
value of total environmental damages increases as well. Proposition 1 and 2 have the following 
corollary: 
Corollary 1. Consider a climate coalition that regulates domestic production and consumption in both 
time periods. Then we have the following: 
i. A credible announcement of increased future unilateral supply-side policies reduces early 
emissions (opposite of green paradox).  
ii. A credible announcement of increased future unilateral demand-side policies always induces 
the weak green paradox. This is also a strong green paradox on the margin if 
 1 12 2 22 1 0v L v L     
Proof. The corollary follows directly from Part iii in proposition 2 and eq.(3).  
Intuitively, there can be no green paradox related to supply-side policies, because emissions decline in 
both periods (cf. Proposition 2). Indeed, the intertemporal leakages that cause the green paradox with 
demand-side policies actually work in favor of the climate coalition in the case of supply-side policies. 
That is, intertemporal leakages cause emissions to decline even before the environmental policy is 
implemented. In the case of future demand-side policies, however, we know that early emissions will 
increase and induce a weak green paradox. Even though we know from Proposition 2 that total 
emissions decline, a marginal increase in demand-side policies in the future may lead to an increase in 
the present value of total environmental damages. This effect (a strong green paradox) may occur if 
the present value of the social cost of carbon declines fast and intertemporal leakage is large.7 See 
further discussion of this issue in Section 2.2 below. 
                                                     
7 Note that the green paradox is not an argument against current demand-side policies per se. On the contrary, the paradox 
arises from more stringent future environmental policy and thus, if anything, constitutes an argument for introducing 
stringent current environmental policy today. 
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2.2 Optimal unilateral supply and demand-side climate policy measures 
In this section we discuss the implications Propositions 1 and 2 have for the optimal mix of demand 
and supply-side policies. Let the coalition’s benefit from consumption of carbon be given by ( )t tB y . 
We assume the climate coalition maximizes domestic welfare (W):8  
         
1 2 1 2
1Max t t t t t t t t t t
y ,y ,x ,x t T
W B y c a p y x Z S

           (12) 
We find the optimal quantities of production and consumption over both periods from the first order 
conditions associated with (12) (see Appendix A). We use these first order conditions to derive the 
optimal consumer taxes ( yt ) and the optimal producer taxes ( xt ) in a competitive fossil fuel market. 
The optimal consumer taxes are defined as the wedges between marginal utility of consumption and 
the resource price. Similarly, the optimal producer taxes are defined as the wedges between the 
resource price and the marginal production cost.9 
 
1 1 1 11 21 11 1 21 2
1 1 1 11 21 11 1 21 2
2 2 2 12 22 1 12 22 2
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   
    
    
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        
      
      
  (13) 
Here, tsR denotes the marginal increase in the import bill in period t following from a unit increase in 
net demand in period s:  
     1 2tts t ts s
pR y x , t ,s ,
y x
       (14) 
We henceforth coin tsR optimal tariff. A tariff on net import leads to lower domestic demand and 
higher domestic production, which contributes to lower international prices, and thus gain a fossil fuel 
importer. Hence, Rts is positive if the coalition is a net importer of fossil fuels.  
From (13), we see that: 
 y xt t tv   .  (15) 
We have the following result:  
                                                     
8 For simplicity, we use the same discount factor for foreign producers as in calculation of the coalition’s social welfare. 
9 The equalities in (13) follows directly from rearranging the first order conditions associated with (12). 
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Proposition 3: Consider a climate coalition that implements domestic measures to reduce global 
emissions. Then we have: 
i. The sum of the optimal demand and supply side taxes on carbon in period t equals the social 
cost of carbon in period t.  
ii. Optimal climate policy implies a combination of demand and supply-side policies within the 
coalition.  
Proof: Part i follows directly from (15). Regarding Part ii, competitive markets and no climate policy 
yield 1 1 1 1B p c c       and 2 2 2B p c   . The right hand side of the four equations in (13) will in 
general differ from zero (except by coincidence). 
Remember that the social cost of carbon at time t includes both present and future marginal damages 
following one additional unit of carbon emissions in period t (cf. (3)). Proposition 3 implies that 
combining demand and supply-side measures induce improved welfare, as compared with pure 
demand-side or pure supply-side policies. The intuition behind this result is straightforward: if the 
regulator has two instruments available (demand and supply side taxes), it is typically best to use them 
both. Further, whereas the total tax is always positive, given a positive social cost of carbon, it is 
possible that either the demand or the supply-side tax is negative (i.e., a subsidy). If we add the 
constraint that the tax shares are bounded in the interval  0,1 , however, a corner solution is fully 
possible. Proposition 3 generalizes the conclusions from the static model considered in Hoel (1994) to 
the dynamic case, where resource exhaustibility is taken into account.  
In Corollary 1 we stated that a future marginal increase in demand-side policies induce a strong green 
paradox if and only if   1 12 2 22 1 0.v L v L     Disregarding the optimal tariffs, we see from (13) that 
if  1 12 2 22 1 0v L v L    , it is optimal to subsidize future consumption  ( 2y <0). This suggests that 
the green paradox is not necessarily a problem per se: if the environmental and economic conditions 
are such that a strong green paradox arises, the regulator should consider subsidizing future 
consumption in order to reduce current emissions. 
We see from (13) that the larger spatial and intertemporal leakages, the lower is the consumer tax, and 
the higher is the producer tax in each period. Large leakages make supply-side polices more efficient 
in terms of reducing global emissions, whereas large leakages dampen the global emission reductions 
following from demand-side policies. Furthermore, due to the terms of trade effects, the larger net 
import of fossil fuel in each period, the larger is the consumer tax and the smaller is the producer tax 
in each period. The impact of the social cost of carbon on the producer and consumer taxes is less 
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straight forward. We see that the larger cost of carbon in period 1 ( 1v ), the larger is the consumer tax 
in period 1, but the smaller is the consumer tax in period 2. Similarly, the larger cost of carbon in 
period 2 ( 2v ), the larger is the consumer tax in period 2, but the smaller is the consumer tax in period 
1. In contrast, an increase in the social cost of carbon in one of the periods, leads to larger producer 
taxes in both periods. In the next section we discuss in more detail how the development of the social 
cost of carbon over time influences the optimal combination of consumer and producer taxes over 
time. 
2.3 Time paths for producer and consumer taxes  
We now examine how the optimal supply and demand-side shares of the total tax develop over time. 
The difference between the consumption tax’s share of the total tax in periods 2 and 1 is given by (see 
Appendix A):  
   2 1 2 1 12 22 11 2111 22 21 12
2 1 1 2 2 1
Spatial leakage
Intertemporal leakage Terms of trade
y y v v R R R RL L L L
v v v v v v
    
 
                  
   (16) 
If the expression in (16) is positive (negative), the optimal consumption tax’s share of the total tax is 
increasing (decreasing) over time.  We observe that the optimal consumption tax’s share of the total 
carbon tax can increase or decrease over time, depending on the development of spatial leakage, 
intertemporal leakage, terms of trade effects and the social cost of carbon. We have the following 
result regarding the impact of the social cost of carbon time trajectory:10 
 
Proposition 4. Consider a climate coalition that implements domestic measures to reduce global 
emissions. Assume that the social cost of carbon is not too small in any of the periods. Then, the 
optimal consumption tax’s share of the total carbon tax decreases (increases) over time for a 
sufficiently large decline (increase) in the present value of the social cost of carbon over time. 
                                                     
10 The condition in Proposition 4 (i.e., that the social cost of carbon is not too small) ensures that the intertemporal leakage 
effects dominate the terms of trade effects. The terms of trade effects in (16) pulls in the direction of a larger consumption 
tax share if the climate coalition’s net import increases over time. 
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Proof. The present value of the social cost of carbon declines over time if 1 2/ 1v v   . We see that 
(16) is negative for sufficiently large absolute value 1 12 2/v L v , unless 2 0v  . Similarly, (16) is 
positive for sufficiently large value of 2 21 1/v L v ,  unless 1 0v  .  
The key to understanding Proposition 4 is that supply-side policy in period t decreases emissions in 
both periods, whereas demand-side policy in period t decreases emissions in period t, but also 
increases emissions in period s t  (cf. Proposition 2). If the social cost of carbon declines over time 
it is more valuable to reduce present emissions than future emissions. It is then better with a relatively 
large supply-side tax share in the future, because that also reduces harmful emissions today. 
Conversely, it is better with a relatively large supply-side tax share today if the social cost of 
emissions increases substantially over time, as that also reduces the very harmful emissions in the 
future. 
We stress that Proposition 4 only regards the supply and demand-side shares of total taxation. The 
sum of these shares, i.e., the optimal total tax on carbon, equals the social cost of carbon (cf. 
Proposition 3).  
We see from (16) that the time paths of supply and demand-side policies also depend on spatial 
leakage. Relatively large future spatial leakage pulls in the direction of lower future demand-side 
taxation. The explanation is that, whereas emissions reductions caused by demand-side policies are 
dampened through spatial leakage, supply-side policies work through higher world prices on fossil 
fuels that reduce foreign consumption (negative spatial leakage), see Table 1.  
3 Numerical illustration 
In this section we substantiate our theoretical results on supply versus demand-side policies along the 
optimal time trajectory using the numerical model PetroHead. We assume that the climate coalition is 
the European Economic Area (EEA), which maximizes domestic welfare. This is done implementing a 
carbon tax satisfying the optimal demand and supply-side tax trajectories given in (13).  
The present paper deals with environmental policy, and we therefore omit terms of trade effects from 
the analysis. There are two main reasons for this choice: first, the EEA is a large net importer of fossil 
fuels and use the consumption tax to improve their terms of trade (lower import bill). It then turns out 
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to be optimal to levy the tax almost fully on the demand side.11 While this result is in itself of some 
interest, it does not facilitate a good numerical illustration of the theory section in this paper. Second, 
the carbon tax induced by terms of trade considerations in (13) is not an environmental tax per se, as it 
would be optimal to levy it even if climate change was absent.  
We first give a brief heuristic account of the model PetroHead. Then we present the numerical results, 
focusing on the  oil market (presenting results from all fossil fuel markets is space consuming and not 
necessary to illustrate our theoretical results).12 For details including exact functional forms and 
parameter values we refer to Appendix B, which also shows the model’s goodness of fit in the period 
1991 to 2013 and selected results from the gas and coal markets. 
3.1 Heuristic model summary 
PetroHead is a dynamic partial equilibrium model for the world oil, gas and coal markets. Its main 
outputs are figures for yearly regional consumption, production, prices and emissions associated with 
oil, gas and coal for the time span from 2013 to 2100. The model also includes biofuels, which we 
model as a perfect substitute for oil. Both production and consumption feature dynamic elements. The 
oil and gas producers maximize the present value of their resource, implying that oil and gas prices 
contain scarcity rents. In addition, the supply-side features sluggish production capacity. This is 
implemented such that current production capacity increases in past production levels. The demand 
side also features sluggishness in the sense of habit formation. That is, present demand for one type of 
fuel depends positively on past consumption of that fuel. This allows the model to differentiate 
between short and long run elasticities.  
3.1.1 Demand for fossil fuels 
PetroHead features six regions that demand oil, gas and coal: The European Economic Area (EEA), 
OECD America, Rest Europe and Eurasia, OECD Asia and Oceania, Non-OECD Asia, and Rest of 
world.13 The demand functions are log-linear with endogenous region-specific prices. The fuels are 
imperfect substitutes for each other. Regional demand functions change exogenously over time due to  
                                                     
11  More precisely, the model simulation with terms of trade suggests that the optimal demand-side tax shares for oil and gas 
associated with the IWG SCC (see figure 1) are 1, whereas the demand-side tax share for coal varies around 0.6.  
12 A detailed numerical analysis of spatial and intertemporal leakage following demand and supply side policies is the topic 
in a forthcoming companion paper.  
13 Except for the EEA, we follow the geographical definitions used in IEA (2014) for consumer and producer regions. The 
choice of regions is a trade-off with transparence and computational ease on the one side, and a detailed description of the 
world fossil fuels market on the other. For example, the need for modelling several regional suppliers is larger for gas than 
for oil and coal, e.g., because of the relatively large costs of transporting gas. 
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changes in regional GDP and energy efficiency. The demand functions have an autoregressive 
distributive lags structure which yields sluggish demand. Demand functions are estimated using yearly 
figures from 1990 to 2012.14 The resulting absolute value long run producer price demand elasticities 
range from 0.1 to 0.76, see Appendix B.15 Future demand is calibrated to match the projections in the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2014 (IEA, 2014).  
3.1.2 Supply of fossil fuels 
Producers maximize the present value of their resource. This implies that the increase in total 
discounted profit from extracting one additional unit of the resource must be equalized across time 
along the optimal extraction path. Whereas this yields positive resource rents in the oil and gas 
markets, coal is available in abundance implying close to zero resource rents.16 All producers are 
competitive with a yearly real discount rate equal to 5 percent. The exception is OPEC, which is 
modelled as a weak cartel in the oil market.17  
Unit production costs increase in cumulative production and decrease in time. This means that 
production costs can rise or fall over time, depending on the resource depletion versus technology 
growth effect. Further, it is costly to produce at levels high above installed production capacity. We 
model this using increasing marginal production cost within a given time period (in addition to 
depletion cost from accumulative production). Production capacity evolves as a differential equation 
depending on previous production and an exogenous element calibrated after IEA (2014). Transport 
costs between regions are very small and constant in the oil market, higher and constant in coal market 
and increase in traded quantities in the gas market. This implies that the regional oil and biofuel prices 
are almost equal, whereas we have bilateral trade between interdependent regional markets for gas and 
coal. Cost functions and transport costs are calibrated using yearly data from IEA (2012, 2014). 
                                                     
14 Consumption and prices are from the “IEA extended energy balances” database, visited October 2014. Regional emissions 
due consumption are from “IEA CO2 emissions from fuel combustion” database, visited June 2015. GDP figures are from 
“IMF World Economic Outlook database”, visited October 2014. 
15 The literature on fuel price elasticities gives a wide range of estimates, inter alia depending on methodology, prices used 
in the estimations and regions included. IEA (2007) estimates of long-run crude oil price elasticities range from -28 (Latin 
America) to -0.01 (Africa). The World Bank (2008) estimates long-run price elasticities for gasoline and diesel at -0.61 and 
-0.67, respectively. Fournier et al. (2013) estimate the average medium to long-run price elasticity in OECD and BRIICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa) countries to be around -0.2. Askari and Krichene (2010) 
estimate long-run demand elasticities to be around -0.01.  
16 Model generated shadow prices for coal are close to zero and have negligible effect on production. It is therefore set equal 
to zero to ease numerical computation.  
17 OPEC behaves roughly in the middle between Cournot and competitive behavior and use a price elasticity equal to -0.5 
for all regions, see Appendix B for details. 
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Regional emissions from extraction of fossil fuels are fetched from the International Association of Oil 
& Gas Producers (OGP).18  
The model features four oil suppliers: OECD America, EEA, OPEC, and Rest of world; five gas 
suppliers: OECD America, EEA, Rest Europe and Eurasia, Asia pacific, and Rest of world; two coal 
suppliers: EEA and Rest of world; and one global biofuels producer with learning by doing and zero 
transport costs.  
3.1.3 Equilibrium 
We use optimal control theory to derive the conditions for producer profit maximum, given the 
regional fuel demand functions. Fuel suppliers perceive the elements of sluggishness as exogenous in 
the current model version; i.e., they do not increase current production in order to increase future 
demand and production capacity. We solve the resulting system of equations as a mixed 
complementarity problem using numerical programming software (GAMS). All regional markets clear 
each period (year) with equilibrium prices so that consumption and production are equal. In the model 
runs we use forecast figures from the New Policies Scenario (i.e., the reference scenario) in the IEA 
World Energy Outlook 2014 (IEA, 2014), and gas transport capacities (for gas transport costs) from 
IEA World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA 2012).19 This version of PetroHead is therefore best suited to 
examine model runs that do not deviate too much from this scenario. This is no problem in the present 
paper. 
3.1.4 Welfare 
In this paper we use PetroHead to illustrate the optimal mix between supply and demand-side policies. 
Thus we need a measure for comparing welfare across the different tax trajectories. We approximate 
changes in welfare, as compared with a business as usual simulation (BaU, no EEA action to reduce 
global warming), using yearly changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus and environmental 
damage associated with the fuels.20 We then calculate the present value of these changes over the time 
                                                     
18 Regional supply and fuel prices are from the IEA extended energy balances” database, visited October 2014. Information 
about present and future gas pipelines and LNG capacities are from IEA (2012). Regional emissions caused by fossil fuel 
production are from OGP (2013). The current model version simplifies by assuming no carbon emissions from biofuels. 
19 We extrapolate the trends given in the projections in IEA (2014) into the future to derive figures for the years after 2040. 
Whereas these figures are highly uncertain and appropriate for illustrative purposes only, the problem is somewhat 
ameliorated by the discounting which dramatically reduces the weight of changes far into the future, and that our results 
are based on comparative statistics using different model runs. The model runs for 100 years in this paper, but we stop 
calculating welfare in 2100. The model is not sensitive to time horizon length.  
20 More precisely, the BaU simulation is the “New Policies Scenario” in IEA (2014). Hence, EEA unilateral climate action 
modelled here is in addition to the climate policies implemented in that scenario.  
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span 2013-2100, using a yearly social discount rate equal to 3 percent and linear approximations to the 
regional demand and supply functions around optimum. The optimal tax trajectory is the one that 
maximizes the increase in this welfare measure as compared to BaU.  
Whereas the total tax on carbon is changed each year (cf. (15)), the demand versus supply side tax 
shares are only allowed to be updated in the years 2013, 2030, 2040, 2050 and 2060 (to simplify 
solving the model). Hence, (13) is only approximately satisfied in this numerical illustration.  
3.2 Numerical results 
Figure 1 shows the present value of the social cost of carbon (SCC) suggested by the Interagency 
Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon (IWG),21 and the associated optimal demand-side carbon 
tax share trajectory in the oil market.  
Figure 1. The present value SCC from IWG and the associated demand-side tax trajectories from 2013 to 2070. The right 
picture shows changes in yearly EEA oil consumption, production and net oil import following this tax trajectory (relative to 
BaU). 
The declining demand-side tax share in Figure 1 follows from interaction between the two first 
mechanisms in (16): Firstly, the potential for oil market spatial leakage is relatively constant over time 
(levying the tax fully on the demand side induces a oil leakage rate that varies around 3-4 percent in 
the time interval from 2013 2070). Secondly, intertemporal leakage causes a decline in the present 
value of the SCC to imply a declining optimal demand-side tax share over time, see Proposition 4.  
                                                     
21 See http://costofcarbon.org/faq. 
22 
 
Figure 1 also shows that oil consumption and oil production declines in EEA, as compared with the 
BaU simulation. Even though the demand-side tax share is higher than the supply side tax share, the 
outcome is an increase in net import over about half of the time horizon. The oil consumption 
reductions become larger over time. 22 There are two reasons for this: Firstly, it takes time for the 
consumers to adjust demand to the higher oil prices. While the first years reflect adaptation captured 
by short run price elasticities, the later years are closer to new consumption habits governed by the 
long run price elasticity adaptation. Secondly, whereas the present value of the SCC declines in this 
simulation, the undiscounted SCC increases, implying a higher oil tax level in the future. On the 
supply-side, the oil tax causes EEA oil production to decline over time, with gradually increasing 
reductions relative to BaU. The reductions grow over time because the producer oil tax increases due a 
higher (running value) SCC and a larger supply-side share of the total tax. In addition, lower 
production levels reduce the EEA oil production capacity relative to BaU over time, which further 
reduces EEA oil production.  
Another notable feature in Figure 1 is the time trajectory for EEA net oil imports. We see that the 
optimal tax trajectory features reductions in EEA oil production and consumption, which causes the 
optimal tax trajectory to induce completely different leakage rates as compared with a pure demand-
side tax.23 Indeed, a pure demand side tax would induce an average leakage rate equal to 3 percent  
over the time horizon 2013 to 2070, whereas the  optimal tax trajectory induces an average leakage 
rate equal to -7 percent over the same time horizon. The leakage is negative whenever the change in 
EEA net oil demand is positive in Figure 1. The explanation is that increased EEA net demand for oil 
increases the global equilibrium oil price. The higher global oil price reduces oil consumption outside 
of the EEA.  
The oil market welfare gain following the optimal tax trajectory in Figure 1 is 20 percent larger than 
the welfare gain following a pure demand side tax. That is, increasing the supply-side oil tax share 
from 0 percent to around 15 percent increases oil market welfare gains from the environmental policy 
by 20 percent (omitting terms of trade).  
 
                                                     
22 The sharper decline in oil consumption starting in 2060 occurs because the optimal demand-side tax share on coal declines 
substantially in 2060, with associated lower coal consumer prices (the supply-side coal tax forces EEA coal production to a 
halt 2060 in the simulation with the IWG SCC, see Appendix B4). 
23 In the theory section we differentiated spatial and intertemporal mechanisms for leakage. The leakage rate in the 
numerical section is caused by both these mechanisms. It is defined as the number of units of increased carbon emissions 
in the rest of the world (non-EEA) in year t per unit of decreased emissions in the EEA in year t.  
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3.2.1 Trajectories for the social cost of carbon: implications for demand versus supply-side 
policies. 
We now compare the optimal supply versus demand-side tax mix associated with the SCC from IWG 
with two stylized time trajectories for the present value of the SCC: one time neutral and one 
increasing.24 Figure 2 illustrates these SCC trajectories and their associated optimal demand-side share 
of the total oil market carbon tax. Note that Figure 2 shows the demand-side shares relative to the tax 
trajectory associated with the time neutral path. 
Figure 2. Three scenarios for the SCC with associated demand-side shares of the total oil tax along the optimal time 
trajectory. 
We know from Proposition 4 that the optimal consumption tax’s share of the total carbon tax 
decreases (increases) over time for a sufficiently large decline (increase) in the present value of the 
social cost of carbon over time  (from intertemporal leakage effects). We observe that the simulation 
runs yield consistent results. Nevertheless, the differences between the demand-side shares are modest, 
suggesting that spatial leakage is a more important factor for the optimal tax trajectory.  
Additional numerical model runs indicate that our qualitative results are robust to alternative values 
for the discount rate, time horizon, the social cost of carbon and EEA oil demand price elasticities. In 
particular, increasing the absolute value of the EEA long run oil and gas price elasticities from 0.1 to 
                                                     
24 The time neutral path is time neutral for the social planner (discount rate 0.03).  
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0.5 only increased the optimal oil tax demand share with 1-2 percent. On the other hand, the oil market 
leakage was positive during the whole time horizon in the simulation with these elasticities. 
4 Concluding remarks  
In this paper we have showed analytically and numerically that unilateral climate policy combining 
demand and supply-side measures improves welfare, as compared with pure demand or supply-side 
policies. Demand-side policies lead to positive intertemporal and spatial leakages, whereas supply-side 
policies lead to leakages of the same magnitudes, but with negative signs. In particular, intertemporal 
leakages, which cause the green paradox with demand-side policies, actually work in favor of the 
climate coalition in the case of supply-side policies. That is, intertemporal leakages cause foreign 
emissions to decline even before the environmental policy is implemented. Further, the optimal 
unilateral carbon tax equals the social cost of carbon and its distribution across consumers and 
producers differs over time, depending on environmental damages, spatial leakages, intertemporal 
leakages and terms of trade effects. For example, a declining social cost of carbon over time supports a 
time path where the consumer tax’s share of the total carbon tax also declines over time.  
In order to derive our results, we have assumed full information about current and future market 
conditions. This is a strong but standard assumption in the economic literature of exhaustible resources 
(Hotelling, 1931; Sinn, 2008; Hoel 2013). The full information assumption also removes challenges 
related to commitment to future environmental policy. Note that the assumption about perfect 
foresight is only crucial for the intertemporal mechanisms we have examined. As such, the result that 
welfare can be improved by combining demand and supply-side policies is robust to less demanding 
assumptions about information. 
Numerical model runs indicate that the optimal oil market demand-side tax share (excluding terms of 
trade) fluctuates around 85 percent of the total carbon tax in the case of unilateral climate policy 
implemented by the European Economic Area (EEA). Although the consumption tax is much higher 
than the production tax, the outcome is an increase in net import over about half of the time horizon.  
Unilateral policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions have so far typically targeted consumption 
of fossil fuels only. The take-home message from the present paper is that welfare gains may be 
achieved by considering long term environmental policies that also include supply-side measures.  
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Appendix A: Calculations and proofs 
Calculation of equation (6):  
Totally differentiating the first order conditions (5) we get: 
1 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2
C C C dX dp
C C dX dp
                 , 
with solution: 
 
 
1 2 1 2
2 1 2 2 2 11 2
1dX C dp p
dX C C dp C dpC C
                 
. 
The equations follow (divide with the relevant price and use partial derivatives; i.e. the other price is 
constant). 
Calculation of the price effects in (9):  
Total differentiation of equation (7) yields (omitting Et): 
 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
2 1 2 2 2 2 2
X / p D X / p dp dz
.
X / p X / p D dp dz
                       
with 1 1 1z y x  . Using Cramer’s rule we get the solution: 
 
 
 
1 2 2 2 2 1 21
2 1 1 1 1 2 12
1 dz X / p D dz X / pdp
dz X / p D dz X / pdp M
                  
  
where      1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 0M D X / p D X / p X / p X / p             by the foreign firms’ 
second order conditions. Using partial derivatives we find: 
 
   
   
1 2 1 1
2
1 1 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 1
1
1 1 1 2 2 1
1 10 0
1 10 0
p X p XD , ,
y x M p y x M p
p X p X, D .
y x M p y x M p
               
                
  
Inserting from (6): 
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   
   
1 1 2 1
2
1 1 1 2 2 2 1
2 2
1
1 1 1 2 2 1
1 0 0
1 1 10 0
p C C pD , ,
y x M C C y x MC
p p, D .
y x MC y x M C
                  
              
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
We have 0 tsL  because        0ts t t t s sL D p p / y x         from equation (9), and  t tD p
<0 ( 1 2t ,s , ). 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
We find from (7) and (9) to (11) that: 
1
1 1 2
t t s s
tt tt st st
t t t t
t s t s
tt st tt st
t t t t
E E E EL , L , L , L ,
y x y x
E E E EL L , L L , t ,s , ,t s.
y y x x
             
                
    (17) 
To prove part i), we observe that 1 1t t tt tt
t t
E E L L
y x
         ; i.e. one unit reduction in 
domestic production and reduction in period t yields one unit reduction in global emissions in period t. 
Further, we see that global emissions in the other period s equal 0s s st st
t t
E E L L
y x
      .  
We observe from (17) that Part ii) is satisfied for 0 1ttL  . In the proof of proposition 1 we proved 
that 0 ttL . It remains to prove 1ttL  . We begin with spatial leakage in period 1: 
 
   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 211 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
1 2
2
1 1 2 1
2
1 2
1
11
1 11
Y ( X x y ) X p X pL
y y p y x p y x
C C D
MC C C C
D
MC C
 
                     
                
      
  
which proves that 11 1
DL   as 0t tM ,C , D   . By similar reasoning, we have:  
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 
   2 2 22 2 1 2 222 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
1 2
1
1 1 2 1
2 1 2 1 2
1
1 1 2 1 2 2
1
1 2
1
1 11
11
1 11
X x yY X p X pL
y y p y x p y x
C C D
MC C C C
C C C C C D
MC C C C C C
C
MC C

  
                 
                
                    
   
2
1
2
C D
C
     
  
which proves that 22 1
DL   as 0t tM ,C , , D   . 
 
Part iii) holds as 0stL  , see proof of proposition 1 and (17).  
 
To prove part iv), we first observe from  (17) that: 
0t s
t t
E E
x x
     as 0stL  , see proof of proposition 1 and (17). 
To determine the sign of t s
t t
E E
y y
   , it remains to derive the expressions for tsL (see eq. (17)) : 
 
   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 212 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
1
1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
Y ( X x y ) X p X pL
y y p y x p y x
DD
C MC C M C MC
 
                  
            
  
 
 
   2 2 2 2 2 1 2 221 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
1 2 1 2 2
2
1 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 1
Y ( X x y ) X p X pL
y y p y x p y x
C C C C DD
C M C C C C MC MC
 
                  
                    
 
From the expressions of ttL and tsL derived above, we find that: 
  1 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 1 2 2 2 21
1 10, 1 0E E E E D C
y y MC C y y MC C
                    
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This completes the proof.  
First order conditions following from (12): 
 
1 1 11 21 11 1 21 2
1 1 1 11 21 11 1 21 2
2 2 12 22 1 12 22 2
2 2 12 22 1 12 22 2
1
1
B p R R ( L )v L v ,
c c p R R L v L v ,
B p R R v L ( L )v ,
c p R R v L L v .
 
  
   
   
      
      
      
     
   
Derivation of equation (16): 
From (13) we find: 
 
2 1 12 22 1 12 22 2 11 21 11 1 21 2
2 1 2 1
12 22 1 12 11 21 21 2
22 11
2 2 1 1
2 1 12 22 11 21
11 22 21 12
1 2 2 1
1 1
1 1
y y R R v L ( L )v R R ( L )v L v
v v v v
R R v L R R L vL ( L )
v v v v
v v R R R RL L L L
v v v v
     

  
 
  
 
         
        
             
  
which is equation (16). 
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Appendix B: PetroHead  
In this appendix we present an algebraic model summary, parameter values and model fit to history for 
the PetroHead version used in this paper.  
B1. Algebraic model summary 
B1.1 The demand-side 
Let the consumer price of fuel  , 1,..., ff ff F n    in region  1,..., jj J n   at time 
 1,..., jt T n   be given by   ( )fj fj fjt t tP P v   (ff is alias). Here fjtP  is the producer price of fuel 
and fjtv  denotes region specific costs like taxes, regional transportation, distribution and refining of 
fuel.25 Demand for fossil fuels is modelled using log-linear demand functions: 
(18)       0 1 , , ,fjfjjy d fjfj fj
f F
j fj
tt t tD G D P f j t
 

    , 
where the β′s are constants and jtG  is a parameter that accounts for total energy demand growth (i.e., 
GDP growth and energy efficiency).26 With 1,..., ii I n   fuel producers with access to region j, 
market clearing requires: 
(19) , , ,fij fjt t
i I
D fx j t

    , 
where fijtx  denotes fuel f extracted by producer i and sold in region j at time t. The demand function 
(18) and the equilibrium condition (19) imply the following equilibrium producer fuel price in region 
j: 
                                                     
25 To simplify language, we do not explicitly refer to indexes denoting fuel f F , region j J , time t T  and firm i I  
in the text, unless this is convenient for understanding. 
26 We use total primary energy demand from the IEA database as a proxy for jtG  in the estimation (and instrumental 
variables using GDP, time and lags when the statistical software Stata’s tests for endogeneity suggests that to be required). 
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(20) 
 
 0 1 \
, , ,
(G ) ( ) ( )
j fj fj
y d
fij fj
t tfj fji I
t tfjfj j fj
tt t
ff F f
x
P v f j t
D P  





          


. 
Here fjt  is a small positive constant included to ensure that price is bounded above.27 
B1.2 The supply-side 
Each fuel producer supplies one type of fuel and have access to all markets j J , at given transport 
costs ijtw  (e.g., LNG transport).
28 Producer i's total production at time t is then i ijt tj J xx  . Let the 
unit cost function of fuel producer i I  be given by: 
(21) 
    
  
1 2 3 3
1 1
, ,
1
, , 1 exp 1 ,
st. ,
iii ti i i i i i i it
tt t i ti
t
ii i
t t t
xC A x t c c cxx
x
A
x
x
c t i t
x   
  
  
        , 
where the c's are constants,  itx  is a proxy for the exogenous part of production capacity, itA  is 
accumulated production and  0,1  . The proxy for the exogenous part in the differential equation 
for capacity  itx  is calibrated using the production projections given in the new policies scenario in 
IEA's World Economic Outlook (IEA, 2014). Firms take capacity itx  as given in the model version of 
PetroHead utilized in the present paper: i.e. they do not increase current production in order to increase 
future production capacity and hence reduce production costs.29 An exhaustible resource owner has 
3 0
ic  , while learning by doing is characterized by 3 0ic   (biofuels).  
                                                     
27 We also use fjt  to account for structural changes in future demand in some regions. For example, the link between GDP 
and coal demand in China is changing rapidly (see e.g. figures in EIA 2014).  
28 The analysis easily generalizes to competitive firms producing several types of fuel, given that the cost function of 
producing different fuel types are independent of each other. In the case of oligopolistic firms, the current model setup 
does not allow consideration of potential cross price effects of production decisions regarding fuel f on prices of other fuels 
ff the oligopolistic firm also produce (which are probably rather small in any case). 
29 Model experimentation suggests that this effect is small for our value of 1/ 4   and substantially increase computational 
complexity. 
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Whereas unit transport costs are constant in the oil and coal markets, unit gas transport costs increase 
in supply from producer i to region j, with fixed time dependent transport capacities ijtx  between 
producers and regions:  
(22) 
 
 
5
5
, \
,
, , ,
, , ,
ij ij
t
ij
ij ij
t tij
gas
t
gas
i I I j t
i I
w
t
c
cw x
x
j
  
  


 
where gasI  is the subset of I consisting of all the gas producers and ijtx  is a proxy for exogenous 
transport capacity. Transport costs are calibrated to roughly match observed transport costs and 
quantities in WEO (2012, 2014). Gas transport capacity from producer i to region j is approximated 
using figures for current and future pipeline and LNG capacities in WEO (2012).  
The state variables for accumulated production are governed by the following differential equation: 
(23) 1 , 0, ,
i i ij i
t t t t
j J
A A x A i t

    . 
Each firm i I maximizes the sum of discounted profits from sales in all regions j J  w.r.t. 
extraction profiles  
1
t Tfij
t t
x

 : 
(24)        1max , ,fij
t
ti fj ij fij i fi
t t t t t
t T j Jx
P w x C x i f 
 
         
     ,  
subject to (20) to (23). Here [0,1)i    is the discount factor. To simplify the formulation of the 
numerical model, define a constant  0,1i   such that 0i   indicates that firm i is perfectly 
competitive and 1i   refer to a Cournot firm. The objective function (24) gives the following 
Hamiltonians for each firm i I : 
        1 1( ) ,, ,ti i fj ij fij fi fi fi fit t t t t t t t
j J
H P w x C x A i f t  

          
   
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with fi fij ijt t tj J j Jx x x   . This is valid also for t T  because the transversality conditions with 
free endpoints iTA  are 0
i
T   (see below). Firms take demand (18) as given in the model version of 
PetroHead utilized in the present paper; i.e., they do not increase current production in order to 
increase future demand.30 
The optimal extraction path must satisfy the following necessary conditions: 
(i) The Hamiltonians for each firm i I are maximized w.r.t. ijtx  for all t. The Hamiltonians 
are concave in ijtx , so 
ij
tx  solves: 
(25)        1 11 0, , , ,fj i it t ti fj ij ij i i tt t t t tij ij ij
t t t
i
P C AP x w i t
x x
j fC
x
                      
    
with = (<) for ( )0ijtx    .  
(ii) The adjoint functions solve the following equations for each firm i I : 
(26)    11 , ,ii t ti i i itt t ti i
t t
CH x i t
A A
       
    
 (iii) The transversality conditions with free iTA  are: 
(27) 0,iT i     
(iv) The extraction path must be admissible, i.e. 0ijtx   and the state variable equations (23) 
holds. 
The Hamiltonian is strictly concave in  , Aij it tx . Thus, the solution satisfying conditions (25) to (27) 
solves the firms maximization problem (24).31  
  
                                                     
30 Model experimentation suggests that this effect, relevant to firms with market power only, is very small and substantially 
increase computational complexity.  
31 The requirement that H(⋅) is concave in  ,Aij it tx  is stronger than necessary, see, e.g., Sydsæter et al (2008). 
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B1.3 Equilibrium 
The full market equilibrium is the unique solution to equations (20) to (23) and (25) to (27). The 
solution is not sensitive to the number of periods nT=100  used in the model run. 
B2. Model estimation and calibration 
The demand side in the numerical model is estimated in terms of natural logarithms: 
  0 1lnG lnln ln , , ,ln
fjfj fj fj j fj fj fj
tt y d
f
t
F
tD P j tD f   

        
This demand function is estimated for each fuel in each region using yearly prices and quantities from 
IEA (2014) for the period 1990 to 2013, see tables B1 to B4. The associated output from Stata 
(statistical software) is available on request. The Dickey-Fuller unit root test suggests that the residuals 
are stationary, suggesting that the non-stationary variables are cointegrated (as do the Johansen test for 
cointegration). Future demand is calibrated to match the projections in the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2014 (IEA, 2014). 
We calibrate 1
fic  such that marginal costs (including approximate resource rent) equals price when 
price and production is the average of the year interval 2004-2013.32 Further, 2
ic  is calibrated such that 
unit cost doubles when production is 25 percent above capacity at 0itA   . Last, we calibrate 3ic  such 
that unit cost doubles when accumulated production equals proven reserves (fetched from BP, 2014). 
The exogenous parts of future production and gas transport capacities are calibrated to match the 
projections in the IEA World Energy Outlooks from 2012 and 2014 (IEA, 2012, 2014). We set yearly 
exogenous technological growth 4
ic  low because technology growth is captured by the exogenous part 
of yearly production capacity calibrated using IEA (2014). 
The tables below use the following legend: demand side: R1 = OECD America, R2 = The European 
Economic Area (EEA), R3 = Rest Europe and Eurasia, OECD R4 = Asia and Oceania, R5 = Non-
OECD Asia, R6 = Rest of world. Supply side oil: Oil1 = OECD America, Oil2 = EEA, Oil3 = OPEC, 
Oil3 = Rest of world; supply-side gas: Gas1 = OECD America, Gas2 = EEA, Gas3 = Rest Europe and 
                                                     
32 Supply cost is not equal to production cost in the calibration, because the resource rent is endogenous. Supply costs equal 
price perfectly in the model runs.  
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Eurasia, Gas4 = Asia pacific, Gas5 = Rest of world; supply-side coal: Coal1 = EEA, Coal 2 = Rest of 
world; supply-side biofuels: Bio = global biofuels producer.  
Table B1. Constant term in fuel demand ( 0ln
fj ) * 
  R1  R2  R3  R4  R5  R6 
Oil  0.743  ‐1.657  ‐2.791  0.331  ‐0.176  1.156 
Gas  ‐3.260  ‐7.271  0.514  ‐0.626  ‐0.874  ‐3.826 
Coal  4.582  ‐1.901  ‐0.831  ‐0.574  ‐0.356  0.888 
*Parameter values differ slightly from the empirically estimated coefficients for some regions to improve fit in model runs 
against history (with model generated endogenous prices). 
 
Table B2. Primary energy demand (GDP*energy intensity) elasticity ( fjy ) 
  R1  R2  R3  R4  R5  R6 
Oil  0.483  0.699  1.188  0.218  0.121  0.318 
Gas  0.876  1.235  0.182  0.139  0.237  0.992 
Coal  0.266  0.395  0.530  0.277  0.160  0.291 
 
Table B3. Demand elasticity in demand last year (autoregressive coefficient in demand function, fjd ) 
  R1  R2  R3  R4  R5  R6 
Oil  0.396  0.499  0.082  0.732  0.905  0.522 
Gas  0.473  0.684  0.711  0.972  0.849  0.461 
Coal  0.000  0.851  0.462  0.696  0.887  0.337 
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Table B4. Short long run price elasticities ( fj )* 
  R1  R2  R3  R4  R5  R6 
Oil- Oil  -0.060  -0.050  -0.092  -0.035  -0.021  -0.048 
Oil to Gas  0.006  0.005  0.009  0.003  0.001  0.005 
Oil to Coal  0.006  0.005  0.009  0.003  0.001  0.005 
Gas to Oil  0.045  0.003  0.003  0.000  0.002  0.005 
Gas to Gas  -0.096  -0.032  -0.003  -0.022  -0.026  -0.054 
Gas to Coal  0.005  0.024  0.003  0.000  0.002  0.005 
Coal to Oil  0.010  0.001  0.005  0.003  0.001  0.007 
Coal to Gas  0.010  0.035  0.005  0.134  0.001  0.036 
Coal to Coal  -0.100  -0.086  -0.005  -0.096  -0.011  -0.066 
*Some values have been increased relative to empirically estimated coefficients (the model needs strictly negative price 
elasticities in order to solve and/or produce reasonable results). We use -0.1 as an upper limit for long run own price 
elasticities in the numerical simulation, and 0.01 as a lower limit for the other price elasticities.  
Table B5. Implied long run price elasticities.  
  R1  R2  R3  R4  R5  R6 
Oil to oil  ‐0.10  ‐0.10  ‐0.1  ‐0.13  ‐0.22  ‐0.1 
Oil to Gas  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Oil to Coal  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Gas to Oil  0.08  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Gas to gas  ‐0.18  ‐0.10  ‐0.1  ‐0.76  ‐0.17  ‐0.1 
Gas to Coal  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Coal to Oil  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Coal to Gas  0.01  0.23  0.01  0.44  0.01  0.1 
Coal to coal  ‐0.10  ‐0.58  ‐0.1  ‐0.32  ‐0.10  ‐0.1 
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Table B6. Parameters in producer cost functions.*  
  Oil1  Oil2  Oil3  Oil4  Bio  Gas1  Gas2  Gas3  Gas4  Gas5  Coal1  Coal2 
C1  108.98  55.98  80.98  85.98  115.98  34.95  42.78  80.78  72.78  88.78  21.65  31.65 
C2  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00 
C3**  0.06  0.95  0.01  0.06  ‐0.09  0.19  0.61  0.04  0.15  0.02  0.00  0.00 
C4**  ‐2.50  ‐2.50  ‐2.50  ‐2.50  ‐2.50  ‐2.50  ‐2.50  ‐2.50  ‐2.50  ‐2.50  ‐2.50  ‐2.50 
ψ  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25 
δ  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95 
θ  0  0  0.5  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
*The j in n  transport costs matrix (c5) is omitted due space considerations. It is available from the authors on request. 
**Divide by 1000 to get model value.  
B3. Model fit to history 
We test the model fit by running the model from 1991. This section presents figures showing model 
projections and historic figures for the period 1991 – 2012.  
Figure B1. Model fit oil market: Endogenous paths against history figures (EIA extended energy balances database, visited 
October 2014) for the period 1992 to 2012.  
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Figure B2. Model fit gas market: Endogenous paths against history figures (EIA extended energy balances database, visited 
October 2014) for the period 1992 to 2012.  
 
Figure B3. Model fit coal market: Endogenous paths against history figures (EIA extended energy balances database, visited 
October 2014) for the period 1992 to 2012.  
B4. Selected results from gas and coal markets in IWG SCC simulation 
In this appendix we briefly present results from the gas and coal markets. The climate policy has 
relatively large effect on the coal market because coal is very emissions intensive, implying higher 
taxes on coal per energy equivalent. Indeed, the coal tax forces EEA coal production to a halt in 2060 
in the IWG simulation. Further, the relative price increase is much larger on coal than on gas, causing 
EEA consumers to substitute away from coal and to gas. That is, EEA gas consumption increases due 
the environmental policy (see Figure 5B).  
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Figure B4. Optimal tax trajectories and the IWG social cost of carbon. The right hand picture shows changes in emissions 
relative to BaU.  
 
Figure B5. Changes in yearly EEA gas and coal consumption, production and net imports following the IWG tax trajectory 
(relative to BaU). EEA coal production ends in 2060 in the IWG simulation.  
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